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Junk: Overeating and obesity and the neuroscience of addiction 
 
Over the last decade intense concern has developed in the West about what has been 
characterised as an obesity epidemic. The current climate of fear about obesity is 
producing a range of effects, including changing attitudes towards food. Some foods are 
no longer just foods; they are increasingly framed as illicit substances, especially for 
people classified as overweight. Can food really be understood as a kind of drug? This 
depends on the way in which the notion of the “drug” is itself defined. Drugs can be seen 
in terms of Mary Douglas’s definition of pollution – as matter out of place (Keane, 2002). 
In this sense, the category of drugs is an entirely political one: it contains all substances 
the consumption of which attracts social opprobrium at a given time. Indeed foods such 
as sugar, fat, and even staples such as bread, are coming to be described as drugs in some 
contexts, and overeating is increasingly framed as a form of addictive behaviour. How do 
new concerns about junk food, health and compulsion impact on notions of drug use and 
addiction? Categories of overweight and obesity capture so many individuals, pathologise 
so large a portion of the population, that their association with compulsivity and addiction 
must surely demand some drift from margin to centre for those concepts. In this article, I 
explore food and obesity as a case study of changing ideas about addiction, asking how 
this new area of public concern is reframing addiction.  
Drawing on an analysis of scientific journal articles that link obesity and 
addiction, the article examines the assumptions that drive such linkages, and their 
implications and effects. As any cursory examination of the scientific literature makes 
clear, wherever obesity is linked to addiction, it is increasingly accounted for via 
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neuroscientific theories of behaviour. The brain’s hedonic and reward systems are cited, 
along with the operations of endogenous opioids and cannabinoids, to frame “excessive” 
eating as addictive behaviour, and “highly palatable” or junk foods as akin to 
conventional drugs – that is, intrinsically addictive in their chemistry. In the process, a 
range of phenomena are enacted. In science studies theorist John Law’s (2011) terms, 
numerous important “collateral realities” are produced. “Drug addiction” is referred to as 
though no controversy exists over its interpretation, and criteria for diagnosis as though 
they are no longer subject to revision. Likewise, “drugs” are produced as a homogenous 
group, the attributes of which, contrary to dominant accounts of drug addiction, are seen 
to warrant no differentiation. In the process, the limitations of such accounts of food, the 
body, health and well-being are exposed. Indeed, food and eating demonstrate even more 
clearly than does drug consumption the limits of neuroscientific accounts of complex 
socially embedded practices. Given this, we must ask why addiction appeals so strongly 
as an explanatory framework, when the epidemiology of overweight and obesity would 
suggest the processes at work are as normal as any that produce normatively slim bodies. 
Does the neuroscience of obesity require the normalisation of addiction? If so, what are 
the implications of this?  
 
THE RISE OF THE NEUROSCIENCE OF ADDICTION  
As do all knowledges, the neuroscience of addiction has political origins. During the 
1970s, illicit drug use was targeted in the United States as a primary cause of social 
disorder. The Nixon government responded in part by funding basic scientific research 
into addiction, mainly through the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA). Across the 
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1980s and 1990s this research came to focus increasingly heavily on neuroscientific 
methods and frameworks. In so doing, new biological truths about the brain – about 
neurotransmitters and receptor sites for drugs – were created (Vrecko, 2010; Courtwright, 
2010). At the same time, the advent of new imaging technologies enabled cheaper and 
easier study of the brain, without the need for surgical access to human brain tissue 
(Campbell, 2007). As Vrecko explains, these developments allowed researchers to form a 
“new neurobiological problem space” and situate addiction within it (p. 61). This space in 
turn enabled new directions in drug control, abstinence-based treatments and anti-drug 
education. These directions continue to develop and unfold as the neuroscientific space 
expands. 
While social and cultural factors are sometimes acknowledged within this field as 
contributing to addiction, the “brain reward system” is the main focus of the new 
approach to addiction. According to neuroscience, the brain’s reward system evolved in 
order to reinforce behaviours geared towards survival – sex and eating being primary 
examples (Hyman, 2005). These activities prompt the release of the neurotransmitter 
dopamine, producing sensations of pleasure. Addictive drugs are said to “hijack” this 
reward system by binding to the same receptor sites in the brain and producing intense 
sensations of pleasure (Robinson & Berridge, 2003). As the brain adapts to the presence 
of a drug, its circuitry changes, further reinforcing the effects of the drug. According to 
NIDA scientists Volkow and Li (2004), this is “the neurobiology of behaviour gone 
awry” (p. 163).  
Greeted by some as a valuable new approach to addiction, this neuroscience 
model has also prompted scepticism among clinicians and researchers. As historian 
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David Courtwright (2010) points out, although the brain model has achieved cultural 
prominence as a scientific theory, its clinical influence has so far been limited, and cannot 
be said to have impacted, as neuroscientists promised, on the stigmatisation of addicts or 
on prohibitionist drug policy in the United States. Despite these limitations, neuroscience 
continues to expand into the domain of addiction and compulsive behaviour, taking in so-
called behavioural addictions and those that defy strict classification, such as overeating 
and obesity. 
 
THINKING THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC  
In analysing this development, it is important to clear an epistemological space beyond 
scientific truths of addiction to ensure the analysis does not find itself relying on the very 
phenomena it seeks to unpack. Given science and its truths are made in society and 
culture, there is a need to situate overeating and obesity socially and culturally too. This 
discussion of the development of scientific accounts of obesity therefore sets off from the 
critical social science literature on obesity.
1
 Social scientists have raised a range of 
questions and concerns about the terms of the obesity debate and its broader validity (for 
example, see Gard & Wright, 2001; Monaghan, 2005; Lobstein, 2006; Campos, Saguy, 
Ernsberger, Oliver & Gaesser, 2005; Rich & Evans, 2005; Stephenson & Banet-Weiser, 
2007). They have contested the epidemiology behind claims of an obesity epidemic, 
questioned the negative health judgements being made about fat, and attempted to locate 
discussion of the meaning of weight, fat, health and fitness in its social context and in a 
more cautious approach to medicalisation than is found in the public health and medical 
literature. Gard and Wright (2001), for example, argue that a kind of premature certainty 
 5 
has been generated about the effects and implications of obesity. They use the work of 
Ulrich Beck to explore the rise of obesity discourse to argue that obesity is now seen as a 
risk of modern Western life amenable to quantification. They challenge this idea 
particularly in relation to the body, arguing that contrary to recent efforts, 
It may well be that the body is not an object that lends itself at all well to rational 
quantification … we need to see scientific uncertainty about the body not as a 
curse but as confirmation that we are not machines. (p. 546-47) 
 
An equally critical approach to the obesity epidemic is found in an article by 
Monaghan (2005). Questioning the science behind the ‘war on fat’, it casts doubt on the 
perceived epidemic of excess weight among UK men. Monaghan does not argue that high 
weight is never harmful to health (although he does query the assumption that it is always 
harmful to health). Instead he calls for debate that refuses the polarisation of health along 
slim/fat lines. His non-dualist approach recalls Gard and Wright’s approach to the non-
rational, careful to avoid either denigrating the usual targets (emotion, fat, the body) or 
inappropriately valorising them, as some have argued is not helpful (see below). Instead, 
Monaghan’s choice of language often consciously disrupts our usual assumptions about 
the alignments between bodies, body size and value. In keeping with this nuanced 
approach to the symbolics of bodies and fat, Monaghan also pays attention to the 
operations of power and stigma in the debate: “‘obesity epidemic talk’ is inseparable 
from social, cultural, political and economic concerns and therefore the exercise of 
power” (p. 309). Likewise, he recognises that body fat invokes and relies on a series of 
potent social and cultural concepts and attributes, and that these are the source of our 
negative views on it.  
Like Monaghan, Campos, Saguy, Ernsberger, Oliver and Gaesser (2005) also 
argue that concern about obesity is unnecessarily high in that it is not supported by 
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evidence. Also like Monaghan, they refer often to “the war on fat” (for example p. 57, p. 
58), and offer a range of reasons for what they see as a widespread misinterpretation of 
data and accompanying “rhetoric”, arguing that it is driven by “cultural and political 
factors’” (p. 55). In short, they propose a primarily economic explanation for the 
production of anti-fat discourse, but combine this with references to the role of 
“ideology”, “anxieties” and “morality”. The paper also draws out the important 
relationship between negative judgments about obesity and negative attitudes towards 
minorities and the poor, and situates these in broader social and political issues such as 
immigration and the economy (p. 58). Emma Rich and John Evans (2005) take an 
important step beyond this work in their discussion of the debate in that they accord 
emotions substantial power in shaping obesity discourse (p. 349). Indeed, they explicitly 
acknowledge the need to consider emotions, those of affected individuals and those 
operating in the broader social context, more closely in analysing how obesity is thought. 
Bethan Evans (2006) too alludes to complex emotional forces at work in how obesity is 
understood, referring for instance to the role of guilt in reactions to it (p. 261). She notes 
that the emotional aspects of eating and body size are largely ignored in policy, save to 
list shame and guilt as causes of overeating (p. 263).  
These contributions go some way toward locating obesity and fat as social and 
cultural concepts, establishing that knowledge about the fat body, even apparently 
objective epidemiological knowledge, is itself shaped by longstanding culturally specific 
fears and assumptions about food and fat bodies. However, this literature leaves much 
unexplored. For more detailed, sophisticated analyses of the meaning of the fat body, it is 
useful to turn the feminist literature on gender, the body and beauty. 
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THINKING THE FAT BODY  
As the preceding section suggests, obesity and the many political, public health and 
medical responses to it need to be understood as emergent within complex nets of 
meaning, subjective experience and social relations, all informed by normative concepts 
of gender, race and class. This is also true of the powerfully abjected central object of the 
debate, fat itself. Here, feminists have made a distinctive contribution to understanding 
the meaning of obesity, and the responses and effects that attend it. Two decades ago, 
influential critic Susan Bordo (1993) made a now classic argument about the meaning of 
fat and the way in which it operates as a gendered figure for ambiguity, permeability and 
unruliness. Utilising Mary Douglas’s insight that, “the ‘microcosm’  the physical body  
may symbolically reproduce central vulnerabilities and anxieties of the ‘macrocosm’  
the social body” (p. 186), Bordo argued that the contemporary attachment to the slender, 
toned body relates to concerns about the “‘correct’ management of desire” (p. 187) and 
the containment of threatening and unruly flesh. In her account, the bulging body is “a 
metaphor for anxiety about internal processes out of control” (p. 189). Much more 
recently, Samantha Murray (2005) has argued that we are “asked … to read the fat body 
as a site of moral and physical decay” (p. 266). LeBesco and Braziel (2001) too draw 
attention to the meanings of fat, noting that the fat body invokes “reckless excess, 
prodigality, indulgence, lack of restraint, violation of order and space, transgression of 
boundary” (p. 3). While women have long been a particular target of these fears (Bordo, 
p. 206), Western social and cultural frameworks now encourage all of us to contain and 
control the body. While the “fat woman” has registered as particularly problematic, fat 
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also implicitly works to undermine or discredit masculinity. Fat, wherever it materialises, 
feminises and casts into doubt the rationality of anyone affected, including “fat” men and 
“fat” children.  
Feminist challenges to normative and proscriptive representations of body size 
have also included celebrations of the non-normative “fat” body (see LeBesco & Braziel, 
2001; Saguy & Riley, 2005). Some critics have, however, queried the move to frame fat 
as resistance. Yancey, Leslie, and Abel (2006) challenge the feminist focus on the perils 
of the slender body, arguing that fat is negatively affecting the health of the least 
advantaged women and that feminists are failing to address the social inequalities 
manifest in weight. Probyn (2008) has questioned the “semiotic reversal” suggested in 
the reclamation of fat (p. 402). For Probyn, “there is something seriously wrong with an 
analysis that leaves untouched the socioeconomic structures that are producing ever 
larger bodies” (p. 402). For these scholars, feminist celebrations or defences of weight 
against the medical and social control of bodies fail to take account of the economic and 
gendered inequities of fat and obesity. While Probyn’s critique raises important issues to 
do with disadvantage and access to health, it has also been criticised for taking the 
‘obesity epidemic’ for granted (Kirkland, 2011). 
Bordo’s (1993) intervention identified the complex gendered negotiations of 
social power in fat and slender bodies, in loose and taut flesh. Her work drew attention to 
the need to recognise the complexity of the meanings attributed to fat, the body, food and 
eating. Murray’s (2005) account of her brief immersion in the fat pride movement and of 
the strong negative response others have to her body weight offers a good example of this 
kind of recognition. As she contends, “every time the fat woman hides her eating from 
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others … she is really eating other people’s disgust at her body” (p. 217). Like Bordo’s 
observations about the symbolic function of fat, Murray’s work points to the profound, 
intricate and powerful social and cultural forces expressed in food and flesh beyond the 
“health” or otherwise of individual overweight bodies. As does other feminist research in 
the area, Murray’s work makes clear that gender dynamics, values of rationality, and 
emotionally charged bodily ideals must be considered when understanding responses to 
overweight and obesity. 
It is on this broad social science, and explicitly feminist, scholarship that the analysis 
conducted here is built. What is obesity and on what foundations are our fears about it 
based? What is fat? How does it function symbolically? What about food? Is it just fuel, 
is it a drug, or does its meaning run deeper and resonate more widely than this? These 
literatures offer at least four critical interventions that form the basis for this analysis: 
1. The ‘obesity epidemic’ should not be taken for granted 
2. Fears about overweight and obesity are informed by a range of factors beyond the 
‘pure science’ of physiology, endocrinology and other health sciences. These 
include commercial forces, historical concepts of the proper body, and gender and 
class norms 
3. Fat should be understood as profoundly social and symbolic, as should food 
4. The politics of eating, fat and obesity are complex and cannot be easily reduced 
either to simple health concerns or to ideas of resistance and self-determination. 
Clearly, obesity, fat and food cannot be lifted from their social and political contexts if 
we are to understand their significance and account for their effects convincingly. Indeed, 
any analysis of the scientific literature on obesity needs such insights to allow critical 
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purchase on issues otherwise presented as incontrovertible facts of value-free scientific 
method, and on phenomena otherwise treated as self-evident material objects beyond the 
reach of social and political forces. 
 
THEORISING REALITIES OF OBESITY AND ADDICTION  
Taking on these lessons from the critical social science literature on obesity and fat 
requires a theoretical approach able to treat the object of analysis as social, as performed 
or enacted by complex social and political forces, as well as entirely material. John Law’s 
(2011) work on collateral realities is useful here. Taking an approach he calls 
“ontological politics”, Law argues that all phenomena (such as the body or the disease of 
obesity) are made in practice rather than given in nature. This making of phenomena 
entails the making of realities, including what he calls “collateral realities”, those that are 
“made along the way” as phenomena are produced. Distinguishing the meaning of 
“reality” intended in the expression “collateral realities” from conventional 
understandings of reality, Law points out that, 
If reality appears (as it usually does) to be independent, prior, definite, singular or coherent then 
this is because it is being done that way. Indeed these attributes or assumptions become examples, 
amongst others, of collateral realities [emphasis in the original]. (p. 156) 
 
In short, reality is not given, or even “socially constructed” in the common sense, rather it 
is, as already suggested, “done in practice”. It must be done again and again to remain 
stable; as such it is multiple and very much open to change. 
Law’s (2011) interest in collateral realities, and in the general multiplicity and 
mutability of reality, is expressly empirical. When he describes realities as made in 
practice, he assumes along with this formulation the need to investigate these practices 
empirically if we are to understand properly realities as they are made, and as they might 
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be made differently (p. 157). Practices, he says, are assemblages of relations. These 
relations can be mapped and tracked to yield knowledge about specific realities.  
The practices Law (2011) refers to include representations, such as those found in 
the scientific literature analysed in this article. Such representations do not merely reflect 
reality, they enact it. It follows from this then, that, “If, performatively, representations 
do realities in practice, then those realities might have been done differently. We find 
ourselves in the realm of politics” (p. 161).  
Law’s (2011) approach corresponds with the approach I take here. Rather than 
merely reflecting a pre-existing reality, the scientific discourse I examine ‘does’ realities, 
does ontological politics. It makes these realities, including, or partly through, collateral 
realities. Law spells out the three main attributes of this approach. First, it allows him to 
track very specifically the features of the enactments that occur in representations (the 
example he uses is that of a conference slide show). How, precisely, do they work? By, 
he says, selecting, juxtaposing, deleting and ranking elements. Second, these realities are 
not stable or consistent. Instead, different realities are enacted at different moments 
according to different needs. Third, he speculates that the multiplicity evident in the 
enacted realities he observes is a requirement of “institutional survival” (p.165).  
Clarifying how this approach can be used across different empirical contexts, Law 
(2011) suggests attention be paid to a series of related issues: first, consider how relations 
are put together in particular order to “produce objects, subjects and appropriate 
locations” (p. 171), and second consider how these assemblages then become and remain 
stable. Third, identify the work being done “to wash away the practices and turn 
representations into windows on the world” (p. 171). How, in other words, do the 
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processes through which realities are made and kept stable become sufficiently obscured 
to allow those realities to appear independent, given in nature rather than produced in the 
social? Fourth, remember that whatever the empirical setting (he cites meeting halls, 
laboratories and surveys), there “is no escape from practices” (p. 171), all, in other words, 
is practice. No other, founding, reality lurks behind them. Last, attend to “gaps, aporias 
and tensions between the practices and their realities” (p. 171). This is where the stability 
of realities become vulnerable, and the possibility of change emerges. 
There is much to take from this approach in analysing the scientific discourse that 
is the subject of this article. Increasingly conceived as the effect of a form of addiction – 
food addiction – obesity is linked in the scientific literature more and more directly with 
the dominant neuroscience account of addiction as brain disease, and individual conduct 
as the direct effect of brain chemistry. Particular collateral realities are enacted in these 
accounts – realities of addiction and drugs themselves, and many others. This analysis 
considers the relations at work to constitute particular realities of obesity, how the 
stability of these realities is achieved and maintained, and the processes or strategies by 
which this stabilising work is simultaneously obscured or “washed away” (Law, 2011, p. 
171). As Law points out, 
whatever is not contested and, more particularly, whatever lies beyond the limits of contestability 
is that which operates most powerfully to do the real. And it is this, to be sure, that is the technique 
that lies at the heart of common sense realism. It is the enactment of collateral realities that turns 
what is being done in practice into what necessarily has to be (emphasis in the original). (p.174) 
 
In what follows I aim to bring back into the domain of contestability the collateral 
realities being made along the way as overeating and obesity come to be framed via the 




The articles analysed in this chapter were collected in two main ways: 
1. A systematic search was conducted across three journals: Addiction, Obesity 
Reviews and International Journal of Obesity (the latter two are both published by 
the International Association for the Study of Obesity). These journals were 
chosen as the key publications in their field (addiction and obesity respectively). 
The terms “addiction” and “obesity” were used together to search the journals’ 
electronic archives for material linking obesity and addiction. This search 
produced a total of 30 articles. The search provided some information on the 
distribution across time of debate about the relationship between obesity and 
addiction, although this was constrained by the limitations of the online archive of 
the International Journal of Obesity (established in 1976, its earliest online issues 
are from 1997) and the relative youth of both the obesity journals (Obesity 
Reviews was first published in 1999).  
2. A general Googlescholar search was also conducted for articles linking obesity 
and addiction across all fields. This yielded a large body of publications, many of 
minimal or no direct relevance to questions about the relationship between obesity 
and addiction (for example, some simply included lists of disorders such as 
obesity and drug addiction). From this corpus, 10 key articles were selected which 
focused explicitly on the debate about overeating as addiction. These spanned a 
range of disciplines, allowing insight into the distribution of debate across 
medical, health and social science fields. 
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Together these searches produced a dataset (N=40) intended to cover both the depth and 
breadth of research on obesity as addiction. Bearing in mind the constraints on some of 
the data collection, the pattern of publication evident in the dataset reflected the broader 
history of the rise of the neuroscience of addiction in that most substantial coverage 
appears after 2000. Once collected and sorted, this corpus of literature was then examined 
in light of Law’s notion of collateral realities. 
 
REPEATING ADDICTION?  
Following Law, we can say that wherever obesity is defined or produced, other, related or 
“collateral” realities are also produced. Probably the most significant reality enacted 
collaterally to the central phenomenon of obesity in the scientific literature collected here 
is that of “addiction” itself. Literature linking obesity with addiction began to emerge in 
the early 1980s and has grown unevenly over time, appearing in small clusters often with 
many years’ gap in between. This temporal spread produces quite different accounts of 
obesity, and at the same time, draws on changing accounts of addiction itself. This is one 
of the challenges or opportunities of linking obesity and addiction – neither phenomenon 
enjoys conceptual stability. Just as obesity has been defined and measured differently 
across the last 30 years or so since it began emerging as a significant public health issue, 
so too has addiction itself. Key source of definitions of addiction, the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) has reviewed its criteria and terminology 
several times. Movements in mental health have influenced the emphasis definitions have 
taken, shifting between psychoanalytic notions to social psychological notions of trauma 
and social determinants, to, more recently, the neuroscientific accounts of the vulnerable 
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brain explored here. In this way, addiction has survived as a viable institutional object of 
psychiatry even as its boundaries and content fluctuate. Indeed, the etiology, attributes 
and implications of addiction have long been, and remain, heavily contested, and a range 
of different treatment modalities and responses (abstinence, harm reduction and so on), 
often accompanied by intense dispute, have developed. Yet this variation across time 
(along with persistent multiplicity at any given time) tends to be downplayed, at times 
“washed away”, in the scientific literature on obesity as addiction.  
In some scientific articles – usually earlier ones – definitions of addiction are 
subjected to scrutiny, and arguments for expanding them to include eating are made. In 
such cases a commitment to achieving a single comprehensive definition is clear. In other 
cases, the stability and utility of existing definitions is taken for granted. Is obesity the 
effect of addiction? This commonly asked question acts to produce addiction as a single, 
stable and self-evident object whether or not the authors conclude in the affirmative or 
the negative. Marks (1990), for example, offers a very confident (in some respects 
narrow, in others extremely broad) definition of addiction in his formulation of the 
similarities between drug addiction and what he calls behavioural addictions such as 
“overeating (bulimia)”: “‘Addiction’ denotes repetitive routines that aim to obtain 
chemicals and, less often, routines without that aim. The latter are behavioural 
addictions” (p. 1389). Here addiction is defined narrowly in that it must entail repetition, 
but broadly, too, in that it embraces anything characterised by routine. As is suggested by 
the publication date (1990), this article does not draw in any detail on neuroscientific 
accounts of addiction. It does make reference to questions about the role of dopamine in 
the brain, but, it says, such questions offer scientists only “tantalising clues” at this stage 
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(p. 1392). Instead the article takes the World Health Organisation definition of 
“dependence syndrome” as its starting point to argue for a more global definition that 
embraces compulsive acts or thoughts beyond those directly related to drugs. Here we 
can see the beginnings of contemporary interest in linking addiction to food, and the use 
of a particular marker of addiction (repetition) to open the way for this linkage. Marks’ 
opening observation (which cites breathing, eating, drinking and other bodily functions) 
that “Life is a series of addictions and without them we die” (p. 1389), places repetition 
squarely at the centre of both addiction and healthy living. In the process, it enacts a 
collateral reality of drug addiction as repetitive drug consumption, and suggests that, 
debates about behaviour aside, a stable agreed-upon category of drug addiction exists. 
At the same time that drug addiction is enacted as a single stable object here – as 
repetitive consumption of a drug – its meaning is also given a novel emphasis in that 
traditional ideas of repetitive consumption and dependence as purely aberrant are 
disrupted, framed instead as normal, indeed in many cases essential. Food is, of course, 
something we must all consume regularly and consistently. Repetition is the basis of life 
itself and as such we are all “dependent’” – upon breathing, eating and so on. In this 
respect, Marks (1990) suggests that notions of food addiction cannot rely on repetitive 
consumption for diagnosis. Even repetitive consumption of “bad” (“highly palatable” 
junk) foods – discussed in the next section – cannot provide the basis for diagnosis in that 
body weight must exceed levels classified as healthy before concern about food intake is 
considered warranted. In other words, some people’s ability to eat chocolate and chips 
each day without exceeding weight injunctions rules out repetition or habit as in itself a 
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basis on which to define food addiction. Instead the notion of “bingeing” is, in Law’s 
terms, selected here for prominence: given emphasis (in Marks’ article, this is bulimia).  
Writing approximately ten years after Marks, Orford (2001) also argues for a 
global definition of addiction, and for the inclusion of non-drug related phenomena (he 
cites gambling, eating and sex), again enacting a particular reality of addiction in the 
process. Citing a 17
th
 century sermon, he argues that, despite many debates, a simple 
definition of addiction is possible and desirable, and it is one that serves a broader notion 
of “appetite” equally well. According to this sermon addiction can be identified where: 
by long usage, an activity that was originally pleasurable has become a “necessity” […] a strong 
craving is part of the experience; and […] despite the many harms that it has brought, neither the 
exercise of reason nor encouragement from others have been sufficient to bring about control. (as 
cited in Orford, 2011, p. 16) 
 
Here, as in Marks’ definition, repetition occupies an important place, leading to a shift 
from choice to necessity, and along with it an absence or loss of control. Craving, a 
concept familiar to diet and weight loss discourse, is also foregrounded here, as it is in 
much of this literature. In this way, longer standing enactments of addiction aimed at 
emblematic substances such as alcohol and heroin and emphasising the problem of 
repetition as daily use, are remade to rank more highly aspects of diagnosis more suited 
to the particular features of eating and overeating. 
Other research, notably more recently published work, departs from the call to 
explicitly redefine addiction made in these articles. Instead, it treats definitions of 
addiction drawn from the drug field as self-evident, erasing (or “deleting”) instability and 
uncertainty as it does so. Davis (2009), for example, aims to identify psychological and 
biological risk factors for overeating, rehearsing the debate about the links between 
eating and addiction, and noting that overeating and “addiction disorders such as drug 
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abuse … both activate the same reward systems” (p. S49). According to Davis, they 
have: 
comparable clinical features, such as their escalating compulsion, the symptoms of tolerance and 
withdrawal, and the overwhelming cravings that contribute to repeated relapses after periods of 
restraint or abstinence. (p. S49)  
 
Here the clinical features of drug addiction are treated as stable, self-evident and beyond 
controversy. As already suggested, assumptions of this kind do not have a strong basis, 
indeed, debate about the presence or otherwise of elements such as tolerance and 
withdrawal remains vigorous and in some important cases, such as that of 
methamphetamine, physical withdrawal is generally considered to be absent (Weaver, 
2010). 
In another article (Gearhardt, Grilo, DiLeone, Brownell & Potenza, 2011), the 
enactment of food addiction’s collateral reality – drug addiction – goes a step further. 
Discussing the addictiveness of food, the authors state that “Food shares multiple features 
with addictive drugs” (p. 1208) especially in their effect on neurocircuitry. The article 
goes on to propose that “Foods and abused drugs may induce similar sequelae, including 
craving, continued use despite negative consequences and diminished control over 
consumption” and suggests that given this, “lessons learned from drug addiction” (p. 
1208) can be applied to obesity policy, prevention and treatment. Claiming that 
neuroscientific accounts of addiction have achieved progress beyond accounts that hold 
individual drug users responsible for their actions, the article invokes the common trope 
of the hijacked brain (Robinson & Berridge, 2003), asserting that this trope may also aid 
in understanding overweight and obesity. Here, as in Davis’s (2009) article, the nature of 
drug addiction (craving, continued use, diminished control) is taken for granted. Its 
features are then attributed to “food problems” and obesity with such a degree of 
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conviction that transfer of policy and practice from the drug field is advocated. While the 
article adopts a provisional tone at points (“Foods and abused drugs may induce similar 
sequelae” [my emphasis]), the overall aim of the article belies this caution. It proceeds as 
though drug addiction is well understood and its features agreed by consensus, and it 
stabilises drug policy, prevention and treatment as so successful as to warrant emulation.  
Elsewhere similar assumptions about the utility of drug addiction responses 
prompt explicit calls for the classification of overeating and obesity as addiction disorders 
so that they too can then be treated using the principles and practices of conventional 
addiction treatment. Davis and Carter (2009), for example, argue that although 
abstinence-based treatments are not viable for eating disorders, and cognitive behavioural 
therapy is not effective for a substantial proportion of patients, the “implicit message” 
sent by a diagnosis of addiction – that affected individuals “may be fighting a strong 
neurobiological drive to overeat in an environment that exploits these urges” – could help 
foster a “therapeutic sense of self-empathy” and encourage participation in addiction 
treatment (p. 5). This portrayal of food addiction does not approximate the way drug 
addiction is generally understood as closely as might be expected from the article’s 
conviction that the two would usefully be classified together. While some responses to 
drug addiction do exhibit a degree of tolerance and sympathy for addicts, there is little or 
no evidence that individuals diagnosed with drug addiction emerge with an equally 
exculpatory view of themselves as “fighting a strong neurological urge” “exploited” by 
their “environment”.  
Davis and Carter (2009) also promote treatment by arguing that: “There is also 
now a range of available medications for each of the major classes of drugs which, in 
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combination with psychotherapy or counselling, have been effective in reducing the 
likelihood of relapse” (p. 6). This remark is as unexpected as their previous statement, 
both because it is difficult, at least at this point in time, to imagine overeaters willingly 
being prescribed most of the actually rather limited range of relevant medications 
presumably included here (opioid replacement pharmacotherapies such as methadone or 
buprenorphine? naltrexone?) and also because the language tends to overstate the 
effectiveness and acceptability, even among existing target groups, of such medications. 
As do the comments made by Gearhardt et al. (2011), this turn to the benefits of drug 
addiction models for the sake of treatment enacts addiction treatments as broadly 
effective and successful. On the contrary, just as the attributes of addiction, and the 
criteria by which it can be meaningfully diagnosed, remain contested, so do assessments 
of the effectiveness of current treatments (Ritter & Lintzeris, 2004). 
To sum up, discussions of the relationship between overeating and drug addiction 
remake addiction in particular ways, selecting relevant features – craving, bingeing – to 
make comparisons viable. Collateral to this remaking are at least two further (highly 
politically charged) realities: first is the enactment of drug addiction as the stable object 
of consensus, its attributes as beyond doubt. While the literature occasionally includes 
qualifying statements acknowledging the variability of addiction definitions, these are 
few and rarely if ever disrupt the larger logic that overeating and obesity can be fruitfully 
conceived and treated as addiction. The second reality constituted here is the notably 
optimistic view of drug addiction policy measures and treatment responses as 




Just as the scientific literature tends to stabilise the concept of addiction, it also stabilises 
another key concept, that of “drugs”. While popular mobilisations of the idea of “drugs” 
tend at times to conflate all substances, treating it as what Derrida (1993) has described as 
a “buzzword” (p. 2), and this tendency can also be found at times in public health and 
treatment responses to drug use, different drugs, especially legal and illegal, are also 
carefully distinguished, and different effects on the mind and the body are ascribed to 
each. Within the neuroscientific account of drug addiction, which draws on the brain’s 
“reward system” to explain addiction, different drugs are also seen as having different 
effects. Some, such as cannabis or heroin, are said to directly mimic or replace 
endogenous chemicals (cannabinoids, opioids) while others, such as the hallucinogens, 
interfere with communication between parts of the brain, producing changes in 
perception and the attribution of meaning. These are very significant differences between 
drugs. Drugs are also understood to vary in other important ways, such as in the 
difference between opioids and amphetamine-type stimulants in producing physical 
dependence and a withdrawal syndrome. The literature analysed here is far less careful in 
recognising the variations between drugs. Indeed, its desire to compare and contrast 
overeating and obesity with “drug addiction” – to enact the two as one by ranking 
overeating as a subcategory of addiction – regularly produces generalising statements 
about drugs. For example, in making a case for the links between overeating and 
addiction, Pelchat (2009) observes that: 
A study of neurochemistry of reward provides a great deal of evidence for similarity between food 
and drug cravings […] Drug abuse is associated with decreased sensitivity of the dopamine-
reward system. The same is true in obese individuals. (p. 621) 
 
 22 
Similarly, Liu, von Denee, Kobiessy and Gold (2010) explain in the abstract to their 
article on the evidence for food addiction, “Good or great smelling, looking and tasting 
food has characteristics similar to that of drugs of abuse” (p. 133). The authors go on to 
posit sugar as an addictive substance, citing its capacity to cause the release of 
endogenous opioids and dopamine in the brain as the basis for its classification as 
addictive. This classification is backed up by the assertion that sugar consumption 
“follows the typical addiction pathway that consists of bingeing, withdrawal, craving, and 
cross-sensitisation” (p. 134). 
Ifland et al. (2009) also frame foods as potential drugs in their own right, targeting 
“refined food” with high levels of salt, sugar, refined carbohydrates, fat and caffeine as 
potentially addictive. Overconsumption of drugs, they argue, follows: “the very same 
mechanisms – pleasure seeking followed by mindless behavioural reinforcement – that 
are operative in the loss of control over certain foods” (p. 519). As described in the 
previous section on addiction, comparative statements of this kind realise addiction as a 
set of fixed attributes, even where some, such as withdrawal, are not considered in the 
addiction field to apply consistently across drugs. Similarly, “drugs” operates as a useful 
comparator for “food”, coalescing as a unitary reality even as neuroscience seeks to 
distinguish the effects on brain chemistry of different drugs. Beyond the homogenisation 
of “drugs” here, the category is also subjected to expansion by proposals to include 
particular foods as drugs. The effects of sugar or “refined” food on brain chemistry are 
key to their reclassification, as are related putative effects such as bingeing and 
withdrawal. If sugar is to become a drug, what are drugs to become? The category of 
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drugs must surely break down or change where everyday substances such as sugar are 
introduced.  
Of course, while I would not wish to draw a clear line between food and drugs 
given the latter is, as already noted, a purely political category, there are differences of 
some significance between the two categories as they are conventionally understood. The 
most obvious of these is that substances conventionally categorised as drugs – cocaine, 
heroin, alcohol, nicotine and so on – are not necessary for life. “Food”, as already noted, 
certainly is, and while it is possible to abstain from cocaine, heroin, and alcohol, it is not 
possible to abstain from “food”. This has implications for the way addiction is conceived. 
It allows room to move in the cramped conceptual territory on which the inconvenient 
dilemma, food is good/food is bad, is emerging in this field. Much discussion of obesity 
or “food addiction” addresses this dilemma by openly or implicitly juxtaposing need and 
want, drawing a distinction that is not necessary to notions of drug addiction in that the 
body has no physiological “need” for drugs, such that distinctions between healthy, 
essential levels of consumption, and unhealthy, excessive levels of consumption do not 
make sense. 
The scientific literature varies in its response to this issue of need and want. Much 
of the research draws on a newly created category of food, mentioned above, sometimes 
termed “refined” or “highly palatable” food. These terms refer to foods high is sugar 
and/or fat and/or salt, and most often, again explicitly or by implication, cheap “junk” 
food. As we saw in the case of sugar, this focus works to produce some foods as drugs, 
juxtaposing them against healthy or natural foods, in that they are excessively dense in 
flavour and energy, and therefore like drugs in their chemistry, able to overstimulate the 
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brain. As with other drugs, this overstimulation creates a feedback loop of reward and 
withdrawal that produces, or in itself constitutes, an addictive state. Here, the problem of 
food as an intrinsically healthy, essential aspect of life is overcome by creating a limited 
category of non-essential drug-like foods. It is this group of foods that, for some (such as 
Volkow and Wise, 2005), should be consumed only at low levels, or, for others (such as 
Ifland et al., 2009), is so drug-like, so ready to alter brain chemistry and cause addiction, 
should be avoided altogether. A notable exception to this approach is that of Rogers and 
Smit (2000) who, relatively early in the rise of the neuroaddiction model of obesity, argue 
that any food can become addictive if it is administered according to the right patterns of 




A second approach to the problem of food as drug is to locate the origins of 
addiction not primarily in the character of the particular food, but in the structure of the 
brain itself, and to distinguish between more susceptible brains and less susceptible 
brains. Susceptibility comes in more than one form however. As Davis et al. (2011) 
explain, 
Low opioid signalling [in some brains] could foster overeating (and drug use) in some individuals 
as a form of “self-medication”, while in others, enhanced opioid signalling could promote greater 
intake of palatable food (and drug use) because of the heightened pleasure experienced from these 
substances. (p. 1352) 
 
Both this approach and the approach that treats some foods as intrinsically addictive see 
brain function as a set of mechanisms able to produce addiction. The latter differs from 
the former, however, by placing the main emphasis on the brain’s built-in vulnerability to 
addiction, presenting food of any kind as potentially addictive where it is consumed 
under particular circumstances – that is, where it is associated with a reward.  
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These two approaches will not be new to scholars of addiction. Despite their 
grounding in the relatively novel field of addiction neuroscience, they reproduce a 
familiar debate about the origins of drug addiction: is addiction caused by characteristics 
of the drug, or is it the product of an internal flaw in the addicted individual? In 
responding to drug addiction, in attempting to reduce its incidence, should we focus on 
individuals and their vulnerabilities, or on drugs and their intrinsically toxic or corrupting 
properties? Should we seek to reduce supply of the corrupting drug, or demand from 
vulnerable individuals? Of course, Western liberal democracies have tended to do both, 
placing individuals into disease categories and identifying factors that lead to individual 
vulnerability to addiction, while also attempting to limit access to (at least some) drugs in 
the belief that such drugs have their own destiny, able to corrupt whomever they come 
into contact with. Vociferous debate accompanies the changes in emphasis that shift over 
time between these approaches, yet, again, this knowledge-making process of debate is 
washed away in this literature’s enactments of drugs and addiction.  
In this respect, as in many others, understandings of drugs tend to be much more 
varied and unstable than the neuroscientific literature on obesity suggests. If everyday 
foods are to be classified as drugs, a very broad definition of drugs must be established 
and maintained. Whether the inclusion of sugar, fat, or composite junk food staples 
(chips, doughnuts, chocolate and so on) works over time to extract some of the force 
from the term, inflecting it instead with the domesticating undertones of common 
expressions such as “comfort food” and “emotional eating” remains to be seen. At this 
juncture it is still difficult to imagine sugar and salt remade as life threatening substances 
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and consumption as shameful and stigmatising, but perhaps what has happened to 
tobacco seemed just as unlikely when campaigns against it began. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This discussion of the scientific literature on obesity has analysed two key collateral 
realities – addiction and drugs – enacted in the process of remaking overeating and 
obesity as addiction. Wherever obesity and overeating have been framed as forms of 
addiction, they have come to be almost exclusively discussed in neuroscientific terms. 
Just as drug consumption now invites neuroaddiction accounts, so does obesity. In some 
respects this meaning-making process is circular. It is hardly surprising that, where drug 
addiction is understood as a malfunction of normal reward systems that govern, among 
other processes, eating, eating comes in turn to be open to addiction discourse. This 
circularity is one way of beginning to answer a question forcefully raised by these 
accounts: how and why have cultures that produced such profoundly meaningful stories 
of food and eating as the Last Supper of the Christian tradition, and such highly refined 
eating practices as molecular gastronomy and the death-row prisoner’s last meal, also 
begun to produce such constrained understandings of the meaning and symbolism of food 
and eating? Part of the answer can be found, too, in the politics of food and the fat body 
identified in the literature described at the outset. But it is also important to consider the 
looping action of powerful notions of addiction, craving and consumption in 
contemporary culture. 
The effects of this process of meaning making, reality enactment, are more than 
circular, however. Their patterns of authorisation refigure addiction as self-evident, and 
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drug treatment as unquestionably effective. As I have demonstrated, the scientific 
literature tends to create collateral realities that treat expertise on drug addiction as far 
more settled, consensual and effective than most of those working in that domain would 
consider accurate. If the obesity literature is to be believed, addiction is a thoroughly 
understood, well-integrated diagnosis for which there are a range of highly effective 
treatments. Drugs can be understood as a coherent category, and their effects generalised 
across individuals and social and cultural contexts. The bodies in which drugs work are 
predictable. The social world sometimes impacts on the problem of addiction, 
exacerbating it, but it is never seen as the source of the very norms and ideals from which 
anxieties about dependence emerge and gain meaning (Sedgwick, 1993). Uniform drugs 
cause clear cases of addiction. Made this way, the reality of food addiction offers itself to 
science for correction. Drugs can be identified and controlled. Addicts can be diagnosed 
and treated. Together, these collateral realities support and authorise each other. If 
obesity experts take up drug addiction models and measures, we are encouraged to think, 
the obesity epidemic will be at least partly solved. Familiar strategies of supply reduction 
(regulation of highly palatable foods) and demand reduction (pharmaceutical 
interventions in brain chemistry) will do this work.  
As Courtwright (2010) has noted, neuroaddiction models have yet to demonstrate 
any real benefits for the problem of drug addiction, and it is likely any such benefits will 
be equally slow, or slower, in coming for food addiction and obesity. In the meantime, 
we must also consider to what extent public understandings of obesity and overeating are 
being shaped by emerging neuroscience accounts. These issues will be explored in detail 
in a forthcoming book (Fraser, Moore and Keane, forthcoming). What gaps if any exist 
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between scientific realities and lay realities, and will they close any time soon? I have 
hinted already at possible answers to this question in the acknowledgment I make above 
of the power and influence of science knowledges, their ability to marshall the 
epistemology and ontology of commonsense realism to support their own institutional 
survival – to “do” realities in particular ways and to wash away the messy processes by 
which this doing is done. It is possible that the language of neuroaddiction will move 
progressively into popular and lay discourse, even if the promises of the science remain 
unfulfilled. Yet this also depends upon practices of contestation. Whatever is not 
contested, whatever lies beyond the limits of contestability, Law says, works most 
powerfully to do the real. This article is one contribution to drawing back within the 
bounds of contestation two fundamentals of the new obesity and, in so doing, to contest 
the proliferating realities of neuroaddiction as well.  
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